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With his ‘meta-ethical’ Principle of Minimal Psychological Realism which holds that moral
prescriptions or ideals must be possible, or perceived to be possible, by creatures likes us,
Owen Flanagan demanded attention for the feasibility of moral theories. In political philos-
ophy a similar awareness underlies the plea for non-ideal theories of, e.g., human rights. The
demand of practical feasibility is, however, sensitive for ideological appropriation. Particu-
larly theorists belonging to the liberal camp begin to question the very idea of social human
rights on grounds of practical infeasibility. In the first part of his article, Henning Hahn
presents the central positions of the debate on the new minimalism in human rights taken by
Amartya Sen, Maurice Cranston and Pablo Gilabert. Initially arguing that a minimalism of
human rights on grounds of practical infeasibility alone proves unjustifiable, Hahn opens
up, in the second part of his article, two further perspectives, which allow practical
infeasibilities to become normatively determinate. In a discussion with James Griffin and
Charles Beitz, Hahn defends the thesis that certain feasibility constraints on (social) human
rights can be justified if they are grounded either in a normative idea of the appropriate
implementation of these rights or in a view of the practical function of a theory of human
rights.
In the second article, by Peter Schulte, we enter the debate on the relation between
morality and rationality. Both are, according to Schulte, normative: the moral prescription
“you ought to help others” is a genuine normative judgment, as well as the rational maxim
“you ought to brush your teeth twice a day”. But, says Schulte, it seems that there is a crucial
difference these two judgments. In the first part of his article, he argues that this difference is
to be understood as a difference between two kinds of normativity: demanding and recom-
mending normativity. The crucial task is, according to Schulte, to explain the difference. In
the second part of this paper, he suggests that meta-ethical expressivists can provide a good
explanation: by extending the analysis of ordinary (non-normative) demands and recom-
mendations to normative judgments, they can formulate a convincing account that captures
the key differences between morality and rationality.
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Since Derek Parfit introduced his Non-Identity problem, Non-Identity arguments pop up
in discussions on various issues, particularly in medical and environmental ethics. In
Anthony Wrigley’s view these arguments have a pervasive but sometimes counter-
intuitive grip. In his article, Wrigley shows how the pervasive force and nature of Non-
Identity arguments rely upon a specific adoption of a theory of modality and identity and
how adopting an alternative account of modality can be used to reject many conclusions
formed through Non-Identity type arguments. By using Lewis’s counterpart-theoretic ac-
count to understand ways we might have been, he outlines the basis of a modal account of
harm that incorporates a person-affecting aspect. According to Wrigley, this has significant
implications for ethical decision-making in areas such as reproductive choice and the welfare
of future generations.
Raimond Gaita’s example of saintly love, in which the visit of a nun to psychiatric
patients has profound effects on him, has been criticised for being an odd and unconvincing
example of saintliness. In her article, Elizabeth Drummond Young defends Gaita against
four specific criticisms: firstly, that the nun achieves nothing spectacular, but merely adopts a
certain attitude towards people; secondly, that Gaita must already have certain beliefs for the
example to work; thirdly, that to be acclaimed a saint requires a saintly biography, not just an
incidence of good behaviour; and finally, that there is something oppressive about saintly
behaviour. Drummond Young considers that Gaita does indeed leave himself open to
criticism on this last point by claiming that saints love impartially. She argues that his
description of the example suggests rather that the customs and practices of partial love are
at the heart of saintliness and not some form of ‘life-denying’ impartiality. If correct, this
view has, according to Drummond Young, the twofold effect of making saintliness appear
achievable by ordinary mortals and explaining our feelings of wonder in the face of such
saintly behaviour.
Empirical research paints a dismal portrayal of the role of reason in morality, says
Lorraine Besser-Jones. It suggests that reason plays no substantive role in how we make
moral judgments or are motivated to act on them. In her article, she explores how it is that an
empirically oriented philosopher, committed to methodological naturalism, ought to respond
to the sceptical challenge presented by this research. While many think taking this challenge
seriously requires revising, sometimes dramatically, how we think about moral agency,
Besser-Jones defends the opposite reaction. Contrary to what recent discussions lead us to
expect, practical reason is not simply a philosophical fiction lacking empirical roots.
Empirical research does not exclude the possibility that practical reason can play a substan-
tive role; rather, there is, she says, evidence that it can help us both to determine our first
personal moral judgments and to motivate us to act on them.
A central topic in economical ethics is how market morality relates to common, everyday
morality. So-called ‘moral institutionalists’ argue for a minimal market morality which
excludes all duties of commission, such as the duty to compensate harm and the duty of
beneficence. This view is defended by Neo-Classical economists such as William Baumol
and Klaus Homann. Moral institutionalists appeal to sociological differentiation theory
which says that modern societies develop different subsystems, each with its own tasks,
goals, modus operandi, and morality. Politics and the market are different sphere, with
different moralities. Moral duties of commission belong to the political sphere, not to the
sphere of the market. In their article, Wim Dubbink and Bert van de Ven reject moral
institutionalism from a Kantian point of view, mostly inspired by Barbara Herman’s thesis
on the invisibility of morality. With liberalism they reject the politicisation of the market. In
their view, this doesn’t imply the rejection of the moralisation of the market. The idea of a
fully differentiated market must also be rejected because it is either morally over-demanding
140 A.W. Musschenga, R. Heeger
(to the morally autonomous person) or morally hazardous (to the person with failing moral
motivation). Contrary to what the moral institutionalists claim, right action is actually quite
difficult in fully differentiated markets.
The common view of reasons is that they are facts that count in favour of some act or
attitude. More recently, says Eric Vogelstein, philosophers have begun to appreciate a
distinction between objective and subjective reasons, where (roughly) objective reasons
are determined by the facts, while subjective reasons are determined by one’s beliefs. While
much attention has been focused on theories of objective reasons, very little has been offered
in the literature regarding what sort of account of subjective reasons we should adopt.
Therefore Vogelstein sets himself to developing a plausible theory of subjective reasons.
Taking what has been said thus far as a starting point, he considers several putative theories
of subjective reasons. Offering objections and amendments along the way, he intends to
settle on what he takes to be a highly plausible account.
The last article discusses Daniel Doviak’s novel agent-based theory of right action that
treats the rightness (or deontic status) of an action as a matter of the action’s net intrinsic
virtue value (net-IVV)—that is, its balance of over vice. This view is designed, according to
Michelle Ciurria, to accommodate three basic tenets of commonsense morality: (i) the
maxim that “ought” implies “can,” (ii) the idea that a person can do the right thing for the
wrong reason, and (iii) the idea that a virtuous person can have “mixed motives.” In her
article, Ciurria argues that Doviak’s account needs to be supplemented with a consequenti-
alist account of the efficacy of well-motivated actions—that is, it should be transformed into
a mixed (motives-consequences) account, while retaining its net-IVV calculus. This is
because she believes that there are right-making properties external to an agent’s psychology
which it important to take into account, especially when an agent’s actions negatively affect
other people.
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